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Abstract 
 The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia inaugurated the 
system of division of powers as a fundamental value of the constitutional 
order. It abandoned the system of unity government (the assembly system), 
along with the one-party system, and substituted them with the multiparty 
parliamentary system. According to the principle of the division of powers, 
the power is divided into legislative, executive, and judicial (Article 8, item 4 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia). The legislative authority 
is exercised by the Assembly; the executive is shared between the 
Government and the President; and the judicial power is exercised by the 
courts. 
Nevertheless, parliamentary democracy is not determined only by the 
constitutional framework, but also by the (un) democratic tradition, the 
model of political culture, as well as the electoral and party system. In this 
sense, the same normative model works differently in different countries or 
at different periods of the development of the same political system. This is 
especially evident in the relations between parliament and government. The 
dominance of the executive is not only a characteristic of the model of 
organization of power in the Republic of Macedonia, but it is also a global 
tendency. In this sense, the parliament of the Republic of Macedonia shares 
the ‘fate’ of the representative bodies in contemporary 
parliamentarism. However, in the absence of a democratic tradition, the 
presence of subject political culture, the strong elements of partocracy and 
the party state, the fragile and fragmented civil society, and the weak general 
public, gives dramatic dimensions to the dominance of the executive over the 
legislative power. 
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Introduction 
The European political space is a world of hybrid models of the 
organization of power (Silanovska, 2006). Consequently, the Macedonian 
model of organization of state power belongs to the group of combined 
systems. Although it is dominated by elements of the parliamentary system, 
it has elements of the presidential system as well. 
The parliamentary characteristics of the Macedonian model of the 
organization of power include: the double-hated executive power; 
Government derives from the parliamentary majority and is accountable to 
the Assembly; and the Government is an (un)stable element of the executive 
power. However, some standard elements of a parliamentary system are 
lacking. These elements include: the compatibility of the MP and the 
ministerial position (Similar to the French model, the institute was 
vigorously supported by De Gaulle). In addition, there is no possibility for 
the dissolution of the Assembly by the President, at the request of the 
Government. 
The elements of the presidential system can be identified in the direct 
election of the head of state, the right of suspension veto, and the 
responsibility of the head of state for violating the Constitution and laws 
(impeachment). Therefore, it is clear that this is neither a “clean” 
parliamentary nor a presidential system. This is a combined model of 
governance, in which there are relicts of the parliamentary system. 
Furthermore, Professor Gordana Siljanovska refers to it as “Macedonian 
constitutional cocktail of the organization of power” (Silanovska, 2006). 
 Academician Evgeni Dimitrov (PhD Evgenij Dimitrov, the first 
professor of Constitutional Law in the Republic of Macedonia) has an 
original view of the organization of state power in the Republic of 
Macedonia. He believes that the Macedonian model of organization of power 
has combined the parliamentary model with certain elements of the assembly 
system. “Regardless of whether this will be a temporary or a lasting 
phenomenon, in addition to the existing basic forms of organization of the 
state, the current theory of constitutional law and political systems should 
define another new model. Nevertheless, this model could be labeled as a 
parliamentary system with elements of the assembly system. Hence, this is a 
system by which the Macedonian model of the organization of state power 
would most certainly belong to (Dimitrov, 1995). 
 
1. The Impact of Government (Executive) on the Assembly 
(Legislative) 
The legislative and executive powers are two wheels of the same 
machine. If their movements are not harmonized, the machine will not 
function properly. The relationship between the legislative and executive 
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authorities is not one-sided. On one hand, the legislature affects the 
executive; while on the other hand, the executive has tools to influence the 
legislative. To assess the impact of the legislative power over the executive, 
some issues are of utmost importance. First, the method of determining the 
holder of executive power; second, the political control over the work of the 
executive power, i.e. the political accountability of the executive power; and 
third, the change of the holders of the executive power. 
The general tendency in the parliamentary system is also present in 
the Republic of Macedonia, i.e. the imbalance in the separation of powers in 
favor of the Government, which becomes much more than the executive 
power. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia is deeply involved in 
the legislative authority through the actual status of dominant proponent of 
the laws; proponent of the budget and other regulations; stating their opinion 
on the proposed laws and other regulations proposed by other authorized 
bodies; participation in the work of the Assembly and its working bodies; 
and the right to request convening a sessions of the Assembly. Here, it is 
worth noting that over 95 percent of the adopted laws have been proposed by 
the Government. Also, it has been passed by the MPs, as they have been 
proposed. Sometimes, it is passed by the MPs even without any discussion of 
the style of the subject political culture and party obedience. 
By the adoption of the Rules of Procedure in 2008, the Government 
had the right as the proponent to submit amendments right until the end of 
the debate. Thus, the practice shows that the government often abused this 
right. Sometimes, at the last minute, it proposed amendments that actually 
changed the previous content of a certain provision of the proposed law. 
(Guseva, 2009) 
The so-called “aggressive” government policy that literally models 
the parliamentary (dis)satisfaction depending on their needs is constantly 
present in the current parliamentary life in the Republic of Macedonia. 
 
2. The Legislative Competence of the Assembly 
The traditional definitions of parliament emphasize its legislative 
function, highlighting it as a place where the legislative policy is created 
(Silanovska, 2013; Treneska, 2013). The Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia defines the Assembly as the representative body of the citizens 
and the institution holding the legislative power. Furthermore, the exercising 
of the legislative activity of the Assembly is inevitably accompanied by 
certain phenomena in all mandates. These mandates include major political 
party disputes and conflicts that sometimes develop into ethno-party 
disputes; overemphasized role of the prime ministers, not only with respect 
to making governmental decisions, but also Assembly decisions; and 
domination of the Government in the legislative process. From the above 
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stated features, the impact of the Government in proposing and passing laws 
is most evident. 
Laws proposed 
by 
(2006-2008) (2008-2011) (2011-2014) 
Government 289 818 888 
Assembly 4 30 19 
Table 1 - Proposed laws in the Assembly from 2006 to 2014 
(http://www.sobranie.mk/godishen-izveshtaj.nspx) 
 
Table 1 shows that the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia 
seems to be more of a voting machine, confirming the proposed decisions by 
the Government, rather than an actual policy maker. Similarly, we can point 
out what is often underlined, i.e. “often enough, legislation is passed through 
Parliament rather than by Parliament” (Haywood, 2004). Thus, the role of 
the MPs and the Assembly is more reactive than it is proactive and creative. 
Therefore, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia is said to be 
“the place where we legitimize and legalize the already adopted decisions 
within the Government, i.e. by party leaderships of the governing parties”. It 
is difficult to prove in this study that the Assembly of the Republic of 
Macedonia is a public political arena for policy making and in resolving the 
practical problems of the citizens. 
On the other hand, the Government is the basic and main engine of 
the legislation. Table 1 confirms the fact that it is the dominant ‘owner’ of 
the proposed legislation. Hence, it places itself as the absolute authority that 
dictates the legislative activity of the Assembly. This is with complete 
freedom to create legislation, and to propose new laws or amend the existing 
laws. Considering the above-mentioned facts, it can be concluded that the 
Assembly is only a place where laws get formal support through the vote of 
the MPs. Therefore, the actual legislator is the Government, i.e. the 
governing parties and their leaderships. 
 
3. Assembly Control over the Government 
In addition to the legislative function, one of the main functions of 
Parliament is its control function. Essentially, political control should be a 
process by which the Parliament continuously and systematically monitors, 
verifies, and assesses the work of the Government. They are namely: the 
theories and concepts of accountability of the Government to Parliament, the 
mechanisms of such responsibility, and the less which corresponds to the real 
situation out of several reasons. First, the work of the Government and its 
departments today spans on a large area, covering various activities in the 
management of the country (its internal and foreign policy, the economy, 
etc.). Therefore, Parliament, despite its best will, has no opportunity to 
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review all the activities. On the other hand, Parliament itself is overloaded 
with many obligations which it needs to enforce as the legislative authority. 
Practically speaking, it cannot control the work of the Government. In 
addition, let us not forget the current extremely unusual situation, i.e. there is 
no opposition in the Assembly. As a result, the Government is basically left 
without any parliamentary control. 
The Constitution and the new Rules of Procedure define the 
mechanisms by which the Assembly performs its political control over the 
executive power - Government and President of the Republic of Macedonia.  
The control of the Government, as a sine qua non of the parliamentary 
system, is only partially implemented in the Republic of Macedonia. It is 
accomplished through MPs’ questions, interpellation, and vote of no 
confidence in the Government. 
The institute MPs’ questions, is a result of the English parliamentary 
practice and first appears in the XVIII century. Since 1886, the questions that 
have been asked orally without notice was been restricted by establishing the 
rules of procedure. According to these rules, they had to be announced in 
advance, asked at a specified time and date, and answered in a pre-
determined time. The interest of the MPs for asking questions was huge, so it 
was necessary to introduce a limit to two questions in one day by one MP 
(Jennings, 1957) 
What is the situation in our country? According to the Rules of the 
Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, MPs’ questions 
can be submitted once a month at a special session, on the last Thursday of 
the month. At the same time, the Rules of Procedure define the obligation for 
compulsory presence by the Prime Minister and the members of the 
Government on the session for MPs’ questions. The MP is entitled to ask the 
Prime Minister questions, the member of the Government, and other public 
officials who are accountable to the Parliament relating to their work. The 
question should be asked orally at the session. Thus, in between the two 
meetings, it should be submitted in writing, through the President of the 
Assembly. At one meeting, the MP can ask up to three questions for a period 
of 10 minutes. The orally asked questions are answered orally not longer 
than 10 minutes. The official to whom the question is addressed may respond 
in writing within 10 days. The written response shall be submitted to the 
President of the Assembly. It is the duty of the President of the Assembly to 
immediately forward the written response to the applicant and to all 
members. Furthermore, the MPs have the right to comment on the answer to 
the question, but the answer itself is not brought up for discussion. 
“Question time” in the Macedonian Assembly did/(has) not 
receive(d) its rightful place neither as an important instrument of 
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parliamentary democracy, nor as an instrument of control and as a means of 
obtaining the necessary information. 
Mandate MPs’ Questions Sessions for MPs’ 
Questions 
Unanswered 
Questions 
2002-2006 1375 25 125 
2006-2008 556 14 130 
2008-2011 795 26 112 
2011-2014 427 22 47 
Table 2 – MPs’ questions in the period 2002-2014 (http://www.sobranie.mk/pratenicki-
prashanja.nspx) 
 
Table 2 shows that in the period of 2002-2014, the number of MPs’ 
questions were very small compared with the British figures (50,000 MPs’ 
questions per year) or the French figures (about 12,000 MPs’ questions in the 
National Assembly and 4700 MPs’ questions in the Senate). Therefore, this 
reflects the influence of the democratic tradition in the use of democratic 
mechanisms. The questions in the British Parliament (oral and written), holds 
a very significant place. Thus, from Monday to Thursday at 14 to 15.30 hrs, 
the House of Commons (the lower house) dedicates its sessions to the 
questions. However, these questions includes both the ones submitted fifteen 
days in advance, which is possibly related to further questions allowed by 
the Speaker, while the others are urgent questions delivered that morning, i.e. 
the private notice questions –PNQS (Duhamel, 2004). 
The second instrument for exercising political control over the work 
of the Government is interpellation. Interpellation is an instrument for 
bringing political responsibility and control over the work of the executive 
power. Thus, there are various elements of informing, and this might lead to 
the overthrowing of the Government at the same time. Interpellation may be 
invoked upon the work of any public official: the Government and every 
individual member thereof, as well as on issues concerning the work of the 
state bodies (Article 72, item 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia). As of January 1991 till date, all interpellations have been 
submitted by the parliamentary groups which acted as the opposition in the 
Assembly. Thus, none was accepted. 
The third and most effective mechanism for achieving political 
responsibility of the Government to the Assembly is the institute vote of no 
confidence in the Government. The Government and each of its individual 
members thereof, answer before the Assembly for their work (Article 92, 
item 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia).  Subsequently, the 
political liability of the Government before Parliament is in twofold: joint 
(collective) and several (personal/individual). Collective liability is exercised 
by voting in support of the no confidence motion in the Government, which 
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is initiated at the request of at least 20 MPs. The voting is carried out upon 
the expiry of three days from initiating the no confidence vote. However, the 
decision of the no confidence motion was adopted by an absolute 
majority. Till date, Parliament was in favour of the no confidence vote in the 
Government only once, at the beginning of the transition in 1992. Here, the 
Assembly decided not to support the expert government that substituted the 
party Government (Silanovska, 2013; Treneska, 2013). In 2008, due to the 
political crisis in the parliament which resulted from the lack of double 
majority, i.e. Badinter majority (in 2006, there was a coalition between 
VMRO-DPMNE and DPA, which was legal in legislative terms. However, it 
was partially illegitimate, since the winner of the Albanian political campus 
was DUI with 16 MPs. DPA had only 11 MPs), the then ruling coalition 
VMRO-DPMNE and DPA, terminated the mandate of the eighth government 
after the first dissolution of the Assembly. 
All previous Governments in the Republic of Macedonia, except the 
coalition governments were “Macedonian-Albanian”, even at times when the 
winning coalition had an absolute majority. Therefore, the Albanian coalition 
partner was chosen according to an unwritten rules “winner in the Albanian 
political campus”. The 1998 Government of Georgievski and the 2006 
Government of Gruevski, derogated from this principle by legally creating a 
coalition with the illegitimate Albanian party. 
The political crisis that arose after the problems of 24 December 
2012, and the opposition's boycott of the recent (2014) parliamentary 
elections, has affected the relations between the two powers: legislative and 
executive. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this is evident even in the most important functions of 
the Assembly, the legislative, and the control function. The Government is 
not only the maker of the government policy, but also the maker of the 
Assembly policy. 
 In the absence of opposition in the Assembly and with the major 
political crisis, it has been the undisputed master of the overall political 
decision-making process. 
 It turned out that the constitutional norms and guarantees are not 
sufficient for a democratic political system based on the principle of division 
of powers. The lack of a long democratic tradition, the (un) democratic 
political culture with strong elements of patriarchy and servitude are not only 
evident in the internal party relations. However, they are also within the 
Assembly and the Government, as well as in their mutual relations 
stimulated by undemocratic tendencies and distortions in the political system 
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of the Republic of Macedonia. In addition, this has inevitably led to lagging 
behind in the European integration processes. 
 On one hand, we need constitutional, legal, and institutional reforms, 
and on the other hand, there is a desperate need for reform in the internal 
party relations, the civil society, and the informing and opinion making of 
the general public in the spirit of Europeanization. 
 Subsequently, it is necessary to identify the factors of the disrupted 
equilibrium between the legislative and executive authorities. Also, it is 
important to find mechanisms that will provide the needed balance, aimed at 
good governance and management. 
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